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CASE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES V. ARPAIO:
THE JUDICIAL LIMIT ON THE
PRESIDENT’S PARDON POWER
ALICIA VILLANUEVA*
INTRODUCTION
Article II of the United States Constitution grants the President un-
limited authority to pardon.1 Specifically, the President “shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United
States (“U.S.”), except in cases of impeachment.”2 Once a pardon is is-
sued, it must be accepted by the pardoned individual for the pardon to
take effect.3 On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump pardoned
Sheriff Arpaio of a conviction for contempt of court.4 The prior month,
the District Court for the District of Arizona (“district court”) had con-
victed Sheriff Arpaio of criminal contempt of court for intentionally fail-
ing to adhere to the district court’s preliminary injunction.5
The preliminary injunction ordered Sheriff Arpaio to stop detaining
individuals based on their Hispanic appearance in order to investigate
civil violations of federal immigration law.6 However, as Sheriff of Ari-
zona’s Maricopa County Sheriff Office (“MCSO”), he continuously and
* J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2020; B.A. Women’s Studies, Saint
Mary’s College of California; Executive Research Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (stating that the
President’s power to pardon is limited only in two circumstances: by cases of impeachment and
applies only to federal offenses).
2 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. at 380.
3 Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 90 (1915).
4 United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 980 (2018); Executive Grant of Clemency of Joseph
M. Arpaio, (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/file/993586/download.
5 United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 3268180, at *7 (D.
Ariz. July 31, 2017).
6 Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 994 (2011).
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intentionally failed to do so.7 Sheriff Arpaio characterized himself as
“America’s Toughest Sheriff”8 and was known for his unequivocal
stance against illegal immigration.9
Subsequently, Sheriff Arpaio accepted President Trump’s pardon
and then moved to vacate his conviction.10 Judge Bolton of Arizona’s
District Court denied Sheriff Arpaio’s Motion to Vacate the Judgment
for criminal contempt of court.11 Arpaio then appealed the denial to va-
cate his conviction before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”).12 At which point, the U.S. Department of
Justice declined to defend Judge Bolton’s order denying Arpaio’s request
for vacatur.13
Absent representation from the U.S., plaintiff’s amici requested that
the Ninth Circuit appoint a special prosecutor to defend the district
court’s decision.14 In a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that it had the authority to appoint a special prosecutor to defend
the Arizona District Court’s order under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 42 and its own inherent judicial power.15
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From 1993 to 2016, Arpaio served as Sheriff of Maricopa County.16
In Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, a group of Latinos filed a class action
lawsuit against Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO for violating their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.17 The plaintiffs’ alleged that MCSO, at
Sheriff Arpaio’s direction, engaged in a policy and practice of stopping
Latino motorists who they assumed had illegally entered the U.S. solely
based upon their Hispanic appearance.18 Thereby, violating their Equal
7 Joe Arpaio: Life as ‘America’s Toughest Sheriff’, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www
.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41015549.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 19, 2017).
11 Id. at 3.
12 United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 980 (9th Cir. 2018).
13 Id. at 981.
14 Id. at 982.
15 Id. at 981-82.
16 United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 3268180, at *1 (D.
Ariz. July 31, 2017).
17 Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 969 (2011).
18 Id. at 992 (Class includes “[a]ll Latino persons who, since January 2007, have been or will
be in the future stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting
in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County Arizona.”).
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Protection rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.19 The
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction against Sheriff
Arpaio and his officers, attorneys’ fees, and any other relief that the court
deemed proper and just.20
A. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF OF 2011
In Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, Judge Snow of the district court is-
sued a preliminary injunction preventing Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO from
enforcing civil state and federal immigration laws by detaining any per-
son based solely on their Hispanic appearance.21 The court concluded
that it could be easily proven that Sheriff Arpaio and his officers at
MCSO had established a policy and practice of racial profiling.22 The
court noted that Sheriff Arpaio had made statements that could be under-
stood as approving and encouraging racial profiling, such as making
comments that his officers “can detain people based upon ‘their speech,
. . . [or] if they look like they came from another country.’”23 His of-
ficers distributed e-mails that “compared Mexicans to dogs, ridiculed
stereotypical Mexican accents, and portrayed Mexicans as drunks.”24
Sheriff Arpaio and his officers conducted special operations in response
to citizens’ complaints based solely on references to places where Lati-
nos congregated but where there was no evidence of a crime.25 Essen-
tially, the court determined that Sheriff Arpaio and his officers engaged
in intentional discrimination based on whether a person appeared to be
Latino.26 The district court ordered a preliminary injunction since it con-
cluded that Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO practiced a policy of racial profil-
ing that would result in ongoing harm.27
B. INVESTIGATION AND FINDING FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
Following the 2011 preliminary injunction, Arpaio continued to pub-
licly engage in a policy and practice of racial profiling.28 Grounded on
extensive testimony that Sheriff Arpaio intentionally defied the 2011 pre-
19 Id. at 968.
20 Id. at 970.
21 Id. at 993.
22 Id. at 986.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 987.
25 Id. at 986.
26 Id. at 987.
27 Id. at 986-87.
28 United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 3268180, at *2-3 (D.
Ariz. July 31, 2017).
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liminary injunction, on August 19, 2016, the district court referred the
matter for prosecution to determine whether Sheriff Arpaio should be
held in criminal contempt of court.29 After several trial continuances, on
July 31, 2017, district court Judge Bolton found that Arpaio willfully and
blatantly disregarded Judge Snow’s December 23, 2011 court order.30
The district court found that Sheriff Arpaio was aware of the injunction
but willfully failed to comply with it.31 Sheriff Arpaio conducted several
interviews with various news channels, such as Fox News, KNVX and
Univision, where he announced that he would “continue to enforce both
state and federal illegal immigration laws as long as the laws [were] on
the books.”32 In application, Sheriff Arpaio continued detaining individu-
als based solely on their Latino appearance and not on suspicion or
charges of a criminal offense.33 From December 23, 2011, to May 22,
2013, he turned individuals over to Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment without having grounds to charge them for a criminal offense.34
Judge Bolton held that Sheriff Arpaio was guilty of criminal contempt of
court due to his flagrant disregard of the preliminary injunction.35
C. EFFECT OF SHERIFF ARPAIO’S PARDON
Sheriff Arpaio was scheduled for sentencing on October 5, 2017.36
However, on August 25, 2017, President Trump granted Arpaio a full
and unconditional pardon of his conviction for criminal contempt of
court and for any other offenses in connection with Melendres v.
Arpaio.37 Arpaio accepted the pardon, and he then filed a motion to dis-
miss the case with prejudice and “to vacate the verdict and all other or-
ders,” including the sentencing on October 5, 2017.38 In response,
several third parties filed briefs as amici curiae in opposition to Arpaio’s
motion.39 In a separate order, decided on October 19, 2017, Judge Bolton
found that the pardon was valid, dismissed the criminal contempt action
against Arpaio with prejudice, but declined to vacate all rulings against
29 Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 4414755 at *2 (D.
Ariz. Aug. 19, 2016).
30 Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 3268180, at *7.
31 Id. at *2.
32 Id.
33 Id. at *4.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *7.
36 Id.
37 Executive Grant of Clemency of Joseph M. Arpaio, (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.justice
.gov/pardon/file/993586/download.
38 United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 980 (9th Cir. 2018).
39 Id. at 982.
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him.40 She reasoned that while a pardon is an act of grace from the Presi-
dent that exempts an individual from the punishment of the law, it does
not “erase a judgment of conviction, or its underlying legal and factual
findings.”41
Arpaio then appealed the district court’s refusal to vacate all rulings
against him.42 The court sought appointment of counsel from the U.S. to
defend the district court’s order denying Arpaio’s request to vacate all
prior rulings.43 The U.S. replied that they did “not intend to defend the
district court’s order” and that they would instead argue that Arpaio’s
motion to vacate should have been granted.44 In response, non-profit or-
ganizations acting as amici curiae for the plaintiffs asked the Ninth Cir-
cuit to appoint a special prosecutor to defend the district court’s
decision.45 On April 17, 2018, the Ninth Circuit held that a special prose-
cutor should be appointed to provide briefing and argument for Arpaio’s
appeal.46
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
Since the U.S. abandoned representation of the district court, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that it could not competently adjudicate the mat-
ter unless they appointed a special prosecutor.47 The Ninth Circuit articu-
lated that it had authority to appoint counsel to defend Judge Bolton’s
decision based on two independent bases: Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 42(a)(2) (“Rule 42(a)(2)”) and its inherent judicial power to ap-
point special counsel when the U.S. abandons representation.48
First, Rule 42(a)(2) allows the court to appoint a special prosecutor
but “[t]he court must request that the contempt [is] prosecuted by an
attorney for the government [and] . . . [i]f the government declines the
request, the court must appoint another attorney to prosecute the con-
tempt.”49 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this rule is not limited to trials
and investigations at the district court level, but could also be applied to
matters in front of the court of appeals.50 The Ninth Circuit recognized
40 Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *3.
41 Id. at *1.
42 Arpaio, 887 F.3d at 980.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 981.
45 Motion for Leave to Participate as Amici Curiae at 1, United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d
979 (2018) (No. 2:16-CR-01012) 2017 WL 5514450.
46 Arpaio, 887 F.3d at 980.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 981-82.
49 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2).
50 Arpaio, 887 F.3d at 981.
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that no case existed where the court of appeals had appointed a special
prosecutor after the government’s refusal to oppose the contemnor’s ap-
peal.51 However, they could not find any reason why “such an appoint-
ment should not take place under Rule 42(a)(2).”52
Second, the Ninth Circuit found that apart from Rule 42(a)(2), it had
the inherent power to appoint a special counsel when the government
declined to represent a position they previously defended.53 The Ninth
Circuit determined it had long been established that the judiciary holds
an “inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience
to their orders, [the] authority which . . . encompasses the ability to ap-
point a private attorney to prosecute the contempt.”54 Citing several
cases, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court has an
established practice of using its inherent power to appoint disinterested
counsel when the government fails to defend its prior position.55
In its October 10, 2018 order denying an en banc hearing, the Ninth
Circuit explained that while the government had successfully prosecuted
and convicted Sheriff Arpaio for criminal contempt of court, a special
prosecutor was necessary to defend that conviction on appeal.56 The
court outlined the importance of the judiciary’s power to prosecute con-
tempt of court cases. While criminal prosecutions are part of the execu-
tive power, prosecution of contempt of court fall within the inherent
power of the judiciary if the government fails to prosecute the contem-
nor.57 Therefore, the appointment of a special prosecutor was an exercise
of inherent judicial power rather than an intrusion on the executive
power because “[p]rosecutions for criminal contempt of the court are dif-
ferent [because] [s]uch prosecutions are vindications of the judicial
power, and the use of private attorneys as special prosecutors is part of
the judicial function.”58
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit’s order, laid out in its April 17, 2018 decision,
would lead to an expansion of the judiciary’s power on two bases. First,
the court expanded Rule 42(a)(2)’s appointment of a special prosecutor
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 980.
54 Id. at 982.
55 Id. (citing Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987); United States
v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1982); Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018); United States
v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988)).
56 United States v. Arpaio, 906 F.3d 800, 801 (9th Cir. 2018).
57 Id. at 803.
58 Id.
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to defend an already prosecuted conviction for contempt of court when
the government abandons its original position in opposing the contem-
nor.59 Rule 42(a)(2) no longer solely applies to prosecutions and investi-
gations of criminal contempt of court, but also applies to defending
successful convictions for contempt of court in front of the court of ap-
peals.60 Second, the court also expanded the judiciary’s inherent power
to include the appointment of a special prosecutor to defend a conviction
of criminal contempt in front of the court of appeals.
However, the dissenting opinions issued in the April 17, 2018 order,
and in the denial for an en banc hearing, strongly suggest that there are
bases for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. This could result in a
reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of judicial power. Judge Tall-
man’s dissent from the April 17, 2018 order concluded that the major-
ity’s decision was inappropriate.61 First, he opined that the amici’s
underlying purpose for requesting a special prosecutor was to challenge
the President’s pardon of Sheriff Arpaio since they failed to timely ap-
peal the pardon.62 Use of  Rule 42(a)(2) to appoint a special prosecutor is
a pretext to circumvent an untimely challenge of a pardon.63 This results
in the judicial branch infringing on the powers designated to the execu-
tive branch.64 Second, Judge Tallman narrowly defined Rule 42(a)(2) to
only apply to the appointment of a special prosecutor when investigating
or prosecuting cases for criminal contempt.65 Since the case for criminal
contempt was already investigated and litigated by the government, the
government did not abandon the prosecution for contempt of court. In-
stead, the government already successfully investigated and prosecuted
the criminal contempt of court, eliminating the need for special
counsel.66
Judge Tashima wrote one of the dissenting opinions when the court
denied the request for an en banc hearing.67 Similar to Judge Tallman,
Judge Tashima reasoned that the court has extremely limited power to
appoint a special prosecutor under either Rule 42(a)(2) or the court’s
inherent power.68 First, Judge Tashima disagreed with the majority’s ap-
plication of Rule 42(a)(2) because the majority’s explanation was based
59 Id.
60 Id. at 802-03.
61 Id. at 803-04.
62 United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2018).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 986.
65 Id. at 984 (emphasis added).
66 Id.
67 United States v. Arpaio, 906 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 2018).
68 Id. at 805-07.
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on finding “no reason why such appointment should not take place under
Rule 42.”69 Such a finding resulted in the judiciary overstepping its role
because the executive branch’s responsibility is to prosecute while the
judiciary’s role is to adjudicate.70 Essentially, by appointing a special
prosecutor, the court acted in the role of the executive branch.71 Second,
he asserts that the majority’s justification for its inherent power based on
the court’s “longstanding practice” to appoint a special counsel is mis-
conceived.72 Judge Tashima indicated that there is a longstanding prac-
tice to appoint a special counsel as amicus curiae to defend a lower
court’s decision on appeal, but there is no longstanding practice of ap-
pointing a special prosecutor.73 Thus, it would have been within the judi-
cial power to appoint amicus curiae to defend the opposition to
contemnor’s appeal instead of intruding on the executive’s power by ap-
pointing a special prosecutor.74
Sheriff Arpaio has until January 8, 2019, to request a review on cer-
tiorari of the Ninth Circuit’s denial for a hearing en banc.75 As of the
writing of this case summary, such request has not been made. However,
it has been reported that Sheriff Arpaio plans on requesting a review by
the U.S. Supreme Court on the Ninth Circuit’s appointment for the spe-
cial prosecutor.76
IV. CONCLUSION
While a presidential pardon wipes out all punishment, it does not
erase the record.77 Notwithstanding a pardon, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the judicial branch has the authority to appoint a special pros-
ecutor to defend a criminal contempt of court conviction when the
government fails to do so.78 Expanding the judiciary’s power, the court
concluded that it has inherent power and is authorized under Rule
42(a)(2) to make such appointments.79 In his effort to vacate his convic-
69 Id. at 806.
70 Id. at 811.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 808.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 805.
75 SUP. CT. R. 13 (90 days from the denial for a hearing en banc on October 10, 2018).
76 Jacques Billeaud, Court Picks Prosecutor to Defend Ruling on Arpaio’s Pardon, A. P.
NEWS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/2b1cac645f25409db751033326236bd4.
77 United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 19, 2017).
78 United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2018).
79 Id.
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tion for criminal contempt of court, Sheriff Arpaio will have to defend
his request against a court-appointed special prosecutor unless he re-
quests a writ for certiorari and the Supreme Court grants his request.
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